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What Consequences Do Ideas Have? 
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE LAW.  By Steven M. Teles.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2008.  339 pages.  $35.00. 
Reviewed by Mark Tushnet
* 
I.  Introduction 
How do you challenge a dominant ideology?  If you have a very long 
time horizon, all you need, you might think, are better ideas.
1  With a shorter 
time horizon—if, for example, you hope to influence public policy within the 
foreseeable future—you need more.  As Steven Teles observes, the fact that 
an ideology is dominant means that those who accept it are likely to control 
institutions whose use is important to challengers with a short time horizon.
2  
These incumbents act as gatekeepers, treating some ideas as worth consider-
ing, even if mistaken, and ignoring or ridiculing others.
3  Successful 
 
  *  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I thank Dan Ernst and 
Frank Michelman for helpful comments. 
1. Think here of Friedrich Nietzsche.  During most of his lifetime, Nietzsche’s works were 
lightly read and not particularly influential.  Even so, he concluded his final book with a chapter 
entitled “Why I Am a Destiny,” in which he confidently predicted that his anti-moral philosophy 
would one day unseat the “slave-morality” that he believed had come to dominate Europe.  See 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ECCE HOMO: HOW ONE BECOMES WHAT ONE IS, reprinted in ON THE 
GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HOMO 215, 326–27 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Vintage 
Books 1969) (1888) (“I know my fate.  One day my name will be associated with the meaning of 
something tremendous—a crisis without equal on earth. . . .  I was the first to discover truth . . . .  I 
am necessarily also a man of calamity.  For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, 
we shall have upheavals . . . the like of which has never been dreamed of.”); see also Robert Wicks, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, in THE  STANFORD  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche (last modified July 15, 2008) (“During his creative 
years, Nietzsche struggled to bring his writings into print and never doubted that his books would 
have a lasting cultural effect.  He did not live long enough to experience his world-historical 
influence . . . .”). 
2. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR 
CONTROL OF THE LAW 15, 14–15 (2008) (discussing advantages for incumbents in professional 
institutions, such as control over hiring decisions and over “access to the information that flows 
through personal and professional networks”). 
3. Id. at 16 (“A regime is most likely to endure when it can make its ideas seem natural, 
appropriate, and commonsensical, consigning its opponents to the extremes.”). 448  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
challengers need to transform these gatekeeping institutions or develop their 
own.
4 
Steven Teles’s wonderful book, The Rise of the Conservative Legal 
Movement, is a case study of ideological challenge.  Teles, a political scien-
tist, emphasizes the institutional dimensions of such challenges.
5  Relying on 
interviews and internal documents produced by conservative organizations,
6 
he examines the development of conservative litigating groups (i.e., 
conservative public interest law firms), the growth of the Federalist Society, 
and the embedding of law and economics within the legal academy.  There 
have been similar studies of liberal public interest law firms and of the rise of 
liberal legalism in the academy,
7 but Teles’s is the first to look on the other 
side of the ideological divide.
8  And, given the dominance of liberal legal 
 
4. See id. at 17 (“[A]n effective challenge to the dominant regime must sink roots in those 
institutions or produce alternative institutions also capable of producing not only knowledge but 
also reputations, prestige, and distinction.”). 
5. As I note below, Teles is less surefooted on the intellectual dimension of the conservative 
challenge to the dominant liberal ideology of law, but that is a rather small weakness in an 
extremely strong book.  See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
6. Teles is aware of the limitations of such materials and correctly does not take what they say 
at face value, although occasionally his analysis might have been deepened by a somewhat more 
skeptical approach to these materials.  For a brief discussion, see infra text accompanying note 17. 
7. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 13–59 (1996) 
(identifying numerous factors—including the advent of legal realism, the New Deal, the 
constitutional crisis of 1937, the post-World War II emphasis on pluralism and democratic process, 
attempts to justify Brown v. Board of Education in the face of newfound concern about the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, and nearly universal admiration of the Warren Court—that contributed to 
legal liberalism becoming the dominant ideology of the legal academy by the early 1970s).  See 
generally M ARK  V.  TUSHNET, THE  NAACP’S  LEGAL  STRATEGY  AGAINST  SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (rev. ed. 2004) (examining the NAACP’s use of litigation to combat 
segregated schools). 
8. Teles notes that his discussion of conservative public interest law firms does not deal with 
litigation efforts by the Religious Right.  TELES, supra note 2, at 287 n.8.  He observes that one 
good book on those groups has been published, which discusses the origin, character, strategies of, 
and reactions to conservative Christian public interest law.  Id. (citing STEVEN  P.  BROWN, 
TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS 
(2002)).  Yet another, published after Teles completed his manuscript, is HANS J. HACKER, THE 
CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE  CHRISTIAN  LITIGATION (2005), which discusses the sometimes 
conflicting motivating forces and internal group characteristics of the “conservative Christian public 
interest law firms of the New Christian Right,” id. at xii.  Teles also observes that the framework he 
develops should be useful in analyzing such groups.  TELES, supra note 2, at 287 n.8 (“I do believe 
that substantial work remains to be done on the subject, and that my emphasis on strategic choice 
and organizational development would add considerably to the foundation laid by Brown.”).   
  Teles’s relative inattention to ideas, though, means that his approach would not provide much 
insight into one important issue that has affected the course of litigation by religious conservative 
groups: a difference over whether such litigation should focus tightly on the Free Exercise Clause, 
thereby bringing the religious aspect of the litigation to the fore, or should treat religious expression 
as a form of speech protected by the Free Speech Clause, thereby reducing or even eliminating the 
specifically religious aspect of the litigation.  Compare Brown, supra, at 47, 61 (arguing that the 
new Christian Right’s “focus on the free speech clause instead of the Constitution’s religious 
clauses” has “yielded a series of legal precedents that have fundamentally changed the relationship 
between church and state in America”), and Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not “Free 
Speech”?, 2000 U.  ILL.  L.  REV. 379, 380–81 (quoting Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of Pat 2008]  What Consequences Do Ideas Have?  449 
 
ideology, his analysis brings out in sharp relief many new insights into the 
institutions that affect the outcomes of ideological contests.  In addition, 
Teles connects his analysis to a broader theme in recent studies of American 
political development.  The “rise of the conservative legal movement” was 
intimately connected to changes in the dominant political order that have oc-
curred over the past thirty years: the decay of the New Deal–Great Society 
political order, and the Reagan Revolution and its limits.
9  In these ways 
Teles provides a firm foundation for thinking (or perhaps merely speculating) 
about future developments in the institutional apparatuses associated with 
conservative and liberal legal thought. 
This Review summarizes and critiques Teles’s analysis of the three 
components of the conservative legal movement, beginning with the least 
important, law and economics in the legal academy, and then turning to con-
servative public interest law firms and the Federalist Society.  It concludes 
with some speculations about the future of that movement, in light of the 
connection Teles rightly draws between that movement and the American 
political regime of the late twentieth century. 
II.  Law and Economics in the Legal Academy 
  Teles begins the first of his two chapters on law and economics in the 
legal academy with the question, “Does the field of law and economics even 
belong in a book on the conservative legal movement?”
10  He begins the sec-
ond by quoting Morton Horwitz’s statement in 1980, “I have the strong feel-
ing that the economic analysis of law has ‘peaked out’ as the latest fad in le-
gal scholarship . . . ”
11  The question is a fair one, and the statement less 
mistaken than one might think. 
 Teles suggests that the question is a fair one because many 
practitioners of law and economics “are quite liberal” and because law and 
economics is at least as much an heir to the legal-realist desire to place legal 
analysis on an empirical basis as it is a part of the conservative legal 
movement.
12  Yet, Teles notes, “[M]any conservatives, especially foundation 
patrons, saw in law and economics a powerful critique of state intervention in 
the economy, and a device for gaining a foothold in the world of elite law 
 
Robertson’s American Center for Law and Justice, as saying in an interview that “the free speech 
strategy has proven effective with judges across the ideological spectrum against opponents who 
rely on the First Amendment’s clause against the establishment of religion”), with  Steven W. 
Fitschen, Religion in the Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Time 
for a New Strategy, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433, 435 (2001) (“I think it has been a mistake to 
posture free exercise claims and defenses as free speech cases.”). 
9. See, e.g., TELES, supra note 2, at 56, 56–57 (describing their mostly unsuccessful challenge 
to the legal liberalism of the 1960s as convincing conservatives to develop their own “apparatus for 
legal change”). 
10. Id. at 90. 
11. Id. at 181. 
12. Id. at 90. 450  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
schools.”
13  In its former aspect, of course, law and economics was just a 
simpleminded version of neoclassical economics, and I doubt that there was 
any particular reason to think that supporting legal economists was a better 
way of developing and publicizing the critique of state intervention in the 
economy than supporting pure economists would have been.
14  From my per-
spective, at least, what mattered about law and economics was the second 
point Teles emphasizes—that it gave conservatives a “foothold” in elite law 
schools.
15 
  Teles provides a lot of detail about the development of the law and 
economics discipline, but I suspect that many readers not deep into law-
school politics (and gossip) will find that the discussion has a flavor of 
“inside baseball” to it.  The saga of Henry Manne is interesting (to me), and 
Teles provides details about the reasons for Manne’s peripatetic course 
among law schools
16 that I had not known.  Further, Teles’s treatment of law 
and economics relies heavily on memoranda written within conservative 
foundations by program officers, a data source that is truly hard to come by.  
Teles is sensitive to the distortions inherent in such memoranda: program 
officers have to show to their superiors on the foundation board that the offi-
cers actually do something other than rubber-stamp proposals, and they do so 
by bad-mouthing the proposals they recommend.
17  Yet this does not mean 
 
13. Id. 
14. One indication of this may be the practice among legal economists of borrowing the 
prestige of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (the formal 
title of what is universally referred to as the Nobel Prize in Economics).  For a discussion, see Mark 
V. Tushnet, Law, Science, and Law and Economics, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 51 n.9 (1997).  
The conservative funders might have been correct, though, to the extent that many of the most 
prominent (conservative) practitioners of law and economics were better publicists than most 
economists and (or because) they provided simpleminded versions of economics of a sort with 
which serious economists would have been uncomfortable.  See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Weasel 
Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1333 (2006); Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy 
in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 287, 357 (2007) (both discussing critiques of law and economics analysis as, respectively, 
simplistic and outmoded). 
15. TELES, supra note 2, at 206. 
16. E.g., id. at 124–30 (providing details on the way in which Manne’s relations with Emory 
University’s president deteriorated and led to the termination of Manne’s ability to create a center 
for law and economics there).  Through programs for judges and law professors, and law and 
economics conferences, Manne had the “first real entrepreneurial success for the [law and 
economics] movement.”  Id. at 90.  Although Teles does not emphasize it, his narrative does a 
reasonably good job of describing Manne’s personality, which I personally find attractively quirky 
but which also seems to have contributed to his difficulties in dealing with more bureaucratic types.  
Teles, for instance, recounts Manne’s colorful rejection of an invitation to join the Yale faculty, id. 
at 109, and his conflicts with administrators, which proved to be obstacles to his entrepreneurial 
goals, id. at 134. 
17. Teles cites two memoranda from the Olin Foundation’s Grant Proposal Record from the 
Foundation’s archives.  Id. at 202  (“‘Staff met with [Daniel] Rubinfeld [of Boalt Hall], and was not 
overly impressed.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 203 (“‘[S]taff had mixed feelings [about a grant given 
to Georgetown University Law Center] because the quality of one conference was questionable.’” 
(citation omitted)).  Disclosure: I was a member of the faculty of Georgetown University Law 2008]  What Consequences Do Ideas Have?  451 
 
that they have any effect on what actually happens once the money flows 
from the foundation.  Still, there is something amusing in reading memos 
written by program officers who could not get a decent academic appoint-
ment criticizing those who did.  A bit more skepticism about the functions of 
these internal memoranda would have strengthened Teles’s treatment, but 
this is a minor criticism. 
  A more important question is the one Teles raises: Who cares?  That 
is, exactly what did conservatives get from a foothold in elite law schools by 
means of law and economics?
18  The final clause in that question is 
important, and returns us to Horwitz’s observation.  Supporting law and eco-
nomics made conservatives captives of economics.  Simple-minded neoclas-
sical economics was fine, because “markets work better than government” is 
a nice slogan.  Low-hanging fruit were picked long ago, though.  As a second 
and now a third generation of legal economists moved into the legal acad-
emy, simple-minded neoclassical economics became visibly marginalized.   
There are some who continue to mouth the slogans, but they are, more or 
less, figures who are not taken seriously, who are invited to conferences sim-
ply to fill out programs (and because of their continuing connection to 
funders), and who are disdained by the serious legal economists. 
The reasons for this development are disciplinary in two senses.  First, a 
young legal economist who wants to make a name and a career has to show 
that she is doing something different from and better than what the first gen-
eration did.  Complexifying the economics is a sure way of doing so, but 
complexity makes sloganeering impossible.  Second, even when law and 
economics took hold, economics itself was using more complicated models 
(and mathematics) than the legal economists favored by conservative foun-
dations were.
19  Or, put bluntly, the first generation of legal economists—the 
 
Center at the time the memo was written, and although I was not involved in soliciting the grant, I 
believe I participated in the conference to which it refers. 
18. See generally id. at 206 (“Given that law and economics’ impact has occurred as the field 
has become more ideologically mainstream, did [conservative] patrons like the Olin Foundation 
really get what they were looking for?”).  Here I think it important to note that Teles properly relies 
on a standard distinction between the use of economics in antitrust cases and the broader field of 
law and economics, which sought to apply the premises of neoclassical economics to essentially all 
fields of law.  See id. at 95 (referring to “[l]aw and economics’ origin in antitrust”).  A parochial 
comment from someone (me) whose field is constitutional law: Law and economics has made 
almost no significant contributions to understanding constitutions or constitutional law, beyond 
dressing up completely familiar points in the garb of economics.  I could provide citations, but 
refrain from doing so out of a perhaps misplaced sense of politeness. 
19. See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 57 (1997) (lamenting the fact that 
the early law and economics movement borrowed “broad theoretical categories” from economists 
and imported “simplified legal notions that economists have not rediscussed since Adam 
Smith . . . into legal scholarship,” with the result that law and economics embraced “naturalist legal 
models” that are “simplistic and unrealistic”); see also Dibadj, supra  note 14, at 1326–27 
(criticizing “conventional interpretations of law and economics from within the literature of welfare 
economics itself” and concluding that “traditional law and economics deeply misunderstands 
modern advances in welfare economics”). 452  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
ones whom the Olin Foundation was enthusiastic about
20—were pretty good 
economists for law professors, but they were no great shakes as economists 
as such.
21  The better legal economists got as economists, the less clear the 
conservative spin of law and economics became.
22  It turned out that in eco-
nomics, as in much else, the most honest statement one could make about 
virtually anything of interest is, “It all depends.”  Horwitz may have been 
premature in saying that law and economics, by which he meant law and 
economics based on simple-minded neoclassical economics, had already 
peaked in 1980,
 23  but he saw that the peak was in sight. 
  In the end, I suspect that the only real accomplishment of law and 
economics in the legal academy was the one described by an Olin 
Foundation staffer in 1993: “[O]ur investment has paid off well at 
Harvard.”
24  Law and economics at Harvard was central to the internecine 
fight there over critical legal studies,
25 and it is (barely) imaginable that with-
out external support for law and economics, proponents of critical legal 
studies and their supporters might have overcome opposition from conserva-
tive public law scholars there (and conservative alumni) to truly dominate the 
school.
26  Preventing the “capture” of Harvard Law School by critical legal 
 
20. See, e.g., TELES, supra note 2, at 202 (reporting that at Stanford Law School, “the Olin 
Foundation saw supporting law and economics as a way of enhancing the resources of an already 
distinguished group of law professors sympathetic to market economics”). 
21. There is an old joke, the punch line of which is, “Yes, but by captains is he a captain?”  So 
too for the first generation of legal economists. 
22. See TELES, supra note 2, at 206 (“[T]he number of true believers has declined as the field 
has become more professionalized.”).  Teles explains that: 
As the stigma on law and economics disappeared and it moved to a position of 
considerable distinction in legal academia, its ideological base expanded accordingly.  
The movement took on the ideological and methodological coloration of its parent 
discipline of economics . . . .  The law and economics that has attained such an 
impressive status in top law schools is not, in short, the aggressively free-market faith 
of the movement’s early days. 
Id. at 218. 
23. His statement continued, “Future legal historians will need to exercise their imaginations to 
figure out why so many people could have taken most of this stuff so seriously.”  Id. at 181.  I take 
“this stuff” to refer to law and economics based on simple-minded neoclassical economics. 
24. Id. at 198 (quoting Olin Grant Proposal Record, Olin Foundation Archives (Oct. 10, 1973)).  
In saying this, I am quite aware that my current institutional affiliation may affect my judgment. 
25. Teles frames his discussion of law and economics at Harvard in such terms.  See id. at 192, 
192–99 (arguing that by supporting law and economics at Harvard Law School, conservative 
foundations “sought nothing less than the ideological redirection of the law school, and the defeat of 
its most dynamic faction, critical legal studies”). 
26. On alumni concerns, I have only indirect evidence, though I am quite confident that there 
were some (and that more research on my part into Harvard’s publications would turn them up).  
For some indications, see Vance R. Coven, Harvard Law School Class of 1971, Letter to the Editor, 
Puerile Notions, HARV.  L.  REC., Nov. 15, 1985, at 9, which refers to Duncan Kennedy’s 
“adolescent superciliousness.”  See also Editorial, A Necessary Balance, HARV. L. REC., Oct. 4, 
1985, at 8 (urging the Law School “administration to take the lead in efforts to . . . encourage a 
more tolerant and more courteous debate” to prevent harm to “HLS as an institution and [to] the 
students”); Carl Shipley, Harvard Law School Class of 1948, Letter to the Editor, Disservice, 
HARV. L. REC., Apr. 20, 1984, at 11 (“[Duncan Kennedy] is doing a great disservice to Harvard 2008]  What Consequences Do Ideas Have?  453 
 
studies might have been quite significant.  But, as I hope the preceding 
sentence suggests, I am skeptical that law and economics was quite as im-
portant as the Olin Foundation’s staff thought.  Beyond that, it is not clear to 
me how law and economics has any significance outside the legal academy. 
III.  Conservative Public Interest Law Firms 
  Teles’s chapters on conservative public interest law firms are the best 
work on the subject that I know of.  His basic point is that these law firms 
developed in two stages.  In the first, conservatives directly emulated the lib-
eral public interest law firms they saw around them.
27  Their efforts at this 
stage were a failure, though.  The reason, Teles argues, is that the firms were 
too closely identified with the business community.
28  This caused several 
problems.  First, liberal public interest law firms could claim that they 
brought lawsuits because collective action problems of various sorts—
“Footnote 4” discrimination,
29 the low stakes individual consumers had in 
any individual regulatory controversy, and the like—impaired their 
constituents’ ability to obtain relief from legislatures.
30  Businesses—at least 
large ones—could not make that claim.
31  Second, the first generation of con-
servative public interest law firms was unable to pull off the public-relations 
move of identifying the interests of large businesses with the public 
 
Law School.”).  The celebrated debate over critical legal studies held at the Harvard Club in New 
York City and sponsored by the Federalist Society suggests to me that alumni concerns were heard.  
Teles describes the New York City Harvard Club debate as a conservative “effort to heighten the 
perception of a crisis” regarding critical legal studies at Harvard Law School. TELES, supra note 2, 
at 196. 
27. TELES, supra note 2, at 67 (discussing Michael Horowitz’s call for conservatives to learn 
from the liberal public interest law movement’s placement of “‘its efforts on a higher moral plane 
than those of its adversaries’” and its “‘engage[ment of] the loyalties of young attorneys and the 
national media’” (quoting MICHAEL  HOROWITZ,  IN  DEFENSE OF PUBLIC  INTEREST  LAW,  THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW MOVEMENT (1980)). 
28. Id. at 68 (explaining that “the privileged role of business in the movement . . . hampered 
[the movement’s] ability to seize the moral high ground and wage the battle of legal ideas”).  Teles 
identifies a number of additional difficulties.  One is the geographical rather than functional 
organization of the first generation of conservative public interest law firms.  See id. at 81 (arguing 
that a later innovation of organizing a conservative interest law firm “functionally by issue instead 
of geographically by region” created the opportunity for strategic client selection).  Another is some 
individual idiosyncrasies that led one such law firm to bet the house on a losing cause.  See id. at 
75–77 (describing the involvement of the Capital Legal Foundation in litigation brought by General 
William Westmoreland against the CBS television network). 
29. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (famously 
proposing a higher level of judicial scrutiny in particular circumstances, including when laws fall 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, place restrictions on the political process, or 
discriminate against “discrete or insular minorities”). 
30. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 366 (1988) (explaining 
the competitive advantage that businesses have over individuals acting collectively in gathering 
information and using it to influence legislation). 
31. As Dan Ernst pointed out to me, public interest litigation is a public good, and, in light of 
business’s self-interest, there is no strong reason to think that business-oriented strategic litigation 
will be undersupplied. 454  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
interest.
32  And, perhaps most important, the businesspeople on the boards of 
these law firms actually disagreed among themselves over the desirability of 
challenges to specific regulations.
33  Roughly speaking, larger businesses 
could accommodate themselves to many regulations without too much diffi-
culty, and they understood that some of their smaller competitors could not.
34  
Regulation, that is, sometimes helped individual businesses in the regulated 
marketplace.
35 
  At the second stage, conservative public interest law firms broke free 
from their dependence on support from business as such and turned to 
libertarian-leaning individuals, most of whom, of course, were successful 
businesspeople who were committed to conservative public interest litigation 
as a matter of principle rather than because such litigation would directly in-
crease their profits.
36  The second generation was markedly more successful, 
within strict bounds.  Its problem was that the regime transformation that oc-
curred in the late twentieth century was not really committed to libertarian, or 
even roughly libertarian, principles.  So, these law firms could win some 
cases and garner some favorable publicity, but they could not firmly embed 
their principles in constitutional law.
37 
  Consider several areas of constitutional law in which conservative 
public interest law firms were involved.  The Institute for Justice, arguably 
the most successful of these firms, has won lawsuits for small businesspeople 
facing quite arbitrary licensing requirements.
38  It has also engaged in a 
 
32. See TELES, supra note 2, at 68–69 (“The firms’ business-heavy caseload lent credence to 
their adversaries’ argument that, far from being defenders of the public interest, they were nothing 
more than shills for conservative business interests.”); id. at 226 (quoting a Center for Individual 
Rights memorandum as saying “conservative public interest law firms have been denounced as 
corporate America’s hired guns”). 
33. See id. at 65 (explaining the division between supporters of free markets and supporters of 
business interests). 
34. Id. 
35. See id. (describing a conflict over cable-television regulation in Denver that “made it clear 
that free markets and business’s interests were necessarily in tension” and that conservative public 
interest law firms “could not expect their business base to stand up for libertarian causes when they 
damaged the interests of specific firms”). 
36. Id. at 221.  Here too the public-good nature of public interest litigation is relevant: Because 
such litigation is a public good, it will be undersupplied by the market.  Conservative donors, 
including foundations, finance such litigation because ideological concerns are part of their 
preference functions (as such preferences are not part of the functions of businesses).  Again I thank 
Dan Ernst for the point. 
37. See id. at 222 (“Despite their impressive success, conservative public interest law firms face 
substantial constraints in their ability to reshape the law and American legal culture.”). 
38. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that 
casket sellers are not required to obtain a funeral director’s license because “[t]here is no reason to 
require someone who sells what is essentially a box to undergo the time and expense of training and 
testing that has nothing to do with the State’s asserted goals of consumer protection and health and 
safety”); Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering and Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1277, 1277–78 
(S.D. Cal. 1997) (declining to dismiss a claim that California’s cosmetology licensing requirement 
violates the Equal Protection Clause because the required licensing curriculum could be shown to be 2008]  What Consequences Do Ideas Have?  455 
 
sustained challenge to regulations as effecting takings of private property 
without compensation.
39  Winning cases for barbers and funeral-home direc-
tors makes those individuals’ lives better,
40 but it inflicts almost no damage 
to the post-New Deal regulatory apparatus.  Conservative public interest law 
firms have had essentially no success and quite a bit of failure in their efforts 
to roll back significant environmental regulations, for example.
41  The tak-
ings litigation culminated in the Kelo case,
42 which everyone agrees called 
the revolution in takings law to a (perhaps temporary) halt.
43  Conservative 
public interest law firms supported challenges to affirmative action and suc-
ceeded in obtaining formal legal limits on the practice, but the extent to 
which those limits actually affect the prevalence of affirmative action is 
surely questionable.
44 
  Teles notes that the second generation of conservative public interest 
law firms consists of a relatively thin institutional structure—basically, the 
Institute for Justice and the Center for Individual Rights, an “A Team” with-
out a “B Team.”
45  And its principles, admirable as they might be, do not fit 
well with today’s regime principles, which I have described elsewhere as 
holding that government cannot do anything more than it is now doing, rather 
 
“a covert attempt to prevent or minimize the practice of African hair styling in favor of 
‘mainstream’ hair styling”). 
39. TELES, supra note 2, at 241 (describing the Institute for Justice’s use of Fifth Amendment 
takings litigation to mobilize supporters, redefine the political agenda, and shift public opinion). 
40. See supra note 37. 
41.  See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, § 6 (Magazine), Apr. 17, 2005, 
at 42, 130 (discussing the sustained but frustrated effort of conservative litigation groups to promote 
their deregulatory philosophy to strike down federal environmental laws). 
42. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (upholding a 
city’s exercise of eminent domain authority to remedy urban blight via commercial redevelopment 
as satisfying the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement). 
43. On the Institute for Justice and regulatory takings litigation, see TELES, supra note 2, at 
241–44.  Frank Michelman has argued that there never was a “takings revolution” at the Supreme 
Court level.  See  Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.  L.  REV.  1600,  1601  (1988) 
(summarizing his conclusion that “there appears to be less than first meets the eye in these apparent 
doctrinal turns to heightened scrutiny and conceptual severance”).  He also suggested to me that 
whatever progress had been made by conservatives was halted not by Kelo but by Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  Lingle held that the “substantially advances” formula is not sufficient 
to determine whether something constitutes a “taking” and that such a claim must be evaluated 
either as a physical taking, a total regulatory taking, or a land-use exaction, 544 U.S. at 545, while 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council held that categorical, per se takings rules should be resisted and 
that takings should be evaluated so as to maximize fairness and justice through a reasonableness 
analysis.  535 U.S. 303–04. 
44. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 62, 60, 56–77 (arguing that there are potentially “far-reaching implications” for 
the expansion of affirmative action programs that follow from the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), that diversity constitutes a compelling interest because it 
promotes “extrinsic social goods like professionalism, citizenship, or leadership”). 
45. For these terms, see TELES, supra note 2, at 254. 456  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
than that government cannot do anything well,
46 much less the regime 
principles that might emerge over the next decades.  Conservative public in-
terest law solved the organizational problems it faced at the outset by adapt-
ing institutionally, with the effect of sharply scaling back its potential to 
achieve real transformation in the dominant regime.  Put another way, con-
servative public interest law firms were indeed part of the “rise of the con-
servative legal movement,” but the heights to which they rose were lower 
than conservative legal activists had hoped at the outset. 
  The story of conservative public interest litigation is important even 
so, less because it is a story of a rise to real heights than because it is a story 
of successful institutional innovation.  The successes were not in what the 
second generation of public interest law firms accomplished, but in their 
creation in the first place.  The institutional innovation had two 
components—patronage and a long time horizon.  Individuals with money 
funded the law firms and, importantly, did not insist on immediate payoffs.  
The patrons understood that building counter-hegemonic institutions takes 
time.
47  Or perhaps “understood” is the wrong term.  Teles suggests that con-
servative legal activists and their supporters stumbled upon a successful 
model for movement building.
48  The contrast with liberal funders in the late 
twentieth century is worth noting as well.  Having established their 
institutions, liberal funders had a much shorter time horizon and typically 
financed only projects that promised payoffs within a relatively short time.
49 
  And, it might be observed in conclusion, we may have seen a return of 
business-oriented conservative litigation, but it is now outside the conserva-
tive legal movement’s institutional framework.  As Richard Lazarus has 
argued, an elite Washington bar now represents businesses before the 
Supreme Court.
50  The businesses are the bar’s direct clients, and the lawyers 
 
46. MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 32 (2003) (“The guiding principle of 
the new regime is not that government cannot solve problems, but that it cannot solve any more 
problems.”). 
47. Teles describes “a ‘Gramscian’ approach of creating a parallel institution,” TELES, supra 
note 2, at 207, which is related to, but not quite the same as, the Gramscian idea of a “long march 
through the institutions.”  See MARK V. TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT 
AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 130–31 (2005) (describing “the long march through 
the institutions” as a move away from tactics such as political protest and open mobilization, and 
toward an emphasis on institutional reform to effect ideological change in civil society). 
48. See TELES, supra note 2, at 277 (discussing the successes of conservative legal mobilization 
despite going “through a very long period of almost complete organizational failure” and 
“succeed[ing] by shrewd adaptation rather than by the far-sighted pursuit of a grand plan”). 
49. This observation is not a criticism of funders on the liberal side during the Great Society 
and for perhaps a decade or two afterwards, because they were financing hegemonic institutions.  
As counter-hegemonic institutions developed, though, these funders failed to adapt quickly 
enough—that is, failed to supplement (at least) their short time horizon with a longer one. 
50. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008) (describing the modern 
reemergence of an elite group of Supreme Court advocates with extensive experience and success in 
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are members of large law firms that make no pretense of having anything 
other than a client-driven agenda.
51  It may be too soon to tell, but my 
impression is that the elite Supreme Court bar has done more to place limits 
on the regulatory state—through the development of a constitutional law of 
punitive damages and, in my view more important, through rather aggressive 
principles of federal regulatory preemption of state law in a world where fed-
eral regulators are themselves reluctant to regulate—than the second genera-
tion of conservative public interest law firms.  The elite Supreme Court bar 
may be the institutional expression of the political regime of the late twenti-
eth century—centered in Washington, without deep principled commitments 
to anything other than what clients want—not the conservative public interest 
law firms Teles discusses. 
IV.  The Federalist Society 
  Perhaps its leaders would be surprised at the comparison, but Teles’s 
account of the creation and operation of the Federalist Society reminded me 
of nothing so much as of Felix Frankfurter and the “Happy Hot Dogs” of the 
New Deal.
52  For Teles, the Federalist Society does four things: (1) it recruits 
law students and lawyers into the conservative legal movement; (2) it has 
meetings and debates that “acquaint them with conservative legal ideas and 
heighten their intellectual self-confidence”; (3) it “facilitate[s] the orderly 
development of conservative legal ideas and their injection into the legal 
mainstream”; and (4) it is a network of relations that, among other things, 
helps members get jobs.
53  All this was true of Frankfurter and his network.
54  
He recruited students from his classes—and then from the classes taught by 
his protégés.
55  He challenged them to think hard about the new administra-
tive state.
56  He and they wrote articles that made New Deal legal thought the 
new mainstream.
57  And, sitting first in Cambridge and then at the Supreme 
 
51. Businesses purchase these services for profit-related reasons, and—again—such reasons 
imply that these services do not have a strong public-goods character.  See supra notes 30, 35. 
52. For an explanatory reference, see MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS 
TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 229–30 (1982).  Parrish explains that men such as Dean Acheson, Pat 
Jackson, Tom Corcoran, Frederick Wiener, Herbert Feis, and Alger Hiss “did not form a 
monolithic, ideologically coherent block of sentiment within the New Deal,” but instead were 
united by their fondness for Frankfurter, gained office through his influence, and became known as 
his “happy hot dogs.”  Id. 
53. TELES, supra note 2, at 136. 
54. See generally P ETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (paperback ed. 1993) (1982) 
(chronicling the influence of New Deal-era government lawyers on national politics and policy, and 
on litigation and legal doctrine). 
55. See id. at 9 (discussing Frankfurter’s placement of “scores of students in New Deal legal 
posts”). 
56. See id. at 8, 7–8 (describing Frankfurter’s “ideals of administrative expertise and 
‘disinterested public service’” (citation omitted)). 
57. See P ARRISH,  supra note 52, at 160 (reporting that “in a series of notable law review 
articles, books, and unsigned editorials,” Frankfurter displayed a “rapierlike prose style” that had a 
significant influence on a “broad . . . audience of informed lay opinion”). 458  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
Court, Frankfurter operated a job placement service for his students and 
protégés, finding them jobs in the executive, legislative, and especially ad-
ministrative arms of the New Deal.
58  Having accumulated insider knowledge 
of the new administrative state, these lawyers then created the modern 
Washington law firm, adept at administrative law in its classic sense (judicial 
review of agency action), and worked with agencies and Congress to develop 
rules favorable to the interests of their clients or to limit the effectiveness of 
rules unfavorable to those interests.
59 
  The Federalist Society did not start out as a job-placement service, of 
course.  Rather, it evolved into one.  Teles emphasizes several important 
points about the Federalist Society as an organization: the continuity of its 
leadership;
60 its “big-tent” conservatism, which allowed it to avoid the inter-
necine battles that often consume more sectarian groups;
61 and its consistent 
self-conception and operation as what Teles describes as a debating society 
rather than as an organization directly intervening in politics.
62  The last 
flowed organically from the Society’s origins as an organization for conser-
vative law students who felt isolated in their schools.
63  Isolation is a relative 
matter, of course,
64 and the fact that the Federalist Society readily located 
large-scale foundation support indicates that, whatever the psychological 
 
58. See IRONS, supra note 54, at 8 (noting that Frankfurter “stuffed” his protégés into New Deal 
agencies through his influence with the Roosevelt Administration with the result that “his former 
students far outnumber[ed] those from other schools and occup[ied] the most influential New Deal 
legal positions”); see, e.g., PARRISH, supra note 52, at 223–29 (reciting Frankfurter’s placements of 
former students and protégés in the Department of Labor, the Solicitor General’s Office, and the 
Department of Agriculture). 
59. For an early account along these lines by a Frankfurter insider, see generally CHARLES A. 
HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952). 
60. See TELES, supra note 2, at 179.  According to Teles: 
The success of the Society was not premeditated, but has been the product of the 
careful strategic leadership of a tight network of individuals who have been with the 
organization since its founding, in tandem with foundation executives and the well-
placed senior members of the conservative legal community who assisted the Society 
at critical junctures. 
Id. 
61. See id. at 153 (“This denial of position-taking could easily be seen as a ruse, but this would 
be a critical mistake, since stopping short of drawing out the policy or legal consequences of its 
principles serves vital organizational maintenance, enhancing the Society’s role in the larger 
conservative movement.”). 
62. See id. at 153, 164. 
63. See id. at 173 (discussing conservatives’ perceived exclusion from law school faculties and 
law school culture). 
64. Without doubting the accuracy of describing the self-understanding of early Federalist 
Society members as “isolated,” I am quite skeptical about actual isolation as a description of 
reality—as compared, for example, to the isolation of serious leftist students in law schools in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s (a group in which I include myself).  We were truly isolated, I think, but 
many of us did not really care, a point captured in the first part of the concluding sentence of 
Roberto Unger’s essay on the critical legal studies movement (less so in the second): “[W]e turned 
away from those altars, and found the mind’s opportunity in the heart’s revenge.”  Roberto 
Mangeibera Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 675 (1983). 2008]  What Consequences Do Ideas Have?  459 
 
state of its young-adult founders, their social location was hardly isolated.
65  
Teles reports that the Society’s organizational characteristics were developed 
spontaneously,
66 as the Society’s admirers of Hayek might appreciate,
67 al-
though I suspect that his interviewees offered accounts that had a somewhat 
more “Gee whiz, Mom, look what we accomplished!” tone than is probably 
warranted. 
  The Federalist Society has operated as a successful network for moral 
support and job placement.  Whether it can continue to do so is, I think, an 
open question.  As to moral support, at this point complaints by Federalist 
Society members about being marginalized in law schools—and therefore 
needing moral support from a network—seem to me to have degenerated into 
self-centered whining.
68  Monica Goodling certainly did not regard member-
ship in the Federalist Society as something to be concealed “in the closet.”
69  
And, if things change, well, perhaps turnabout is fair play. 
The job-placement function was immensely aided by divided 
government during most of the late twentieth century.  Except for a brief pe-
riod in Bill Clinton’s first term, conservative Republicans always controlled 
one or more of Washington’s main institutions—the presidency and admin-
istrative agencies for most of the period, the Senate for a while, and then both 
houses of Congress at century’s end.  Federalist Society members always had 
somewhere to go.  Note, though, the difference from the Happy Hot Dogs: 
Federalist Society members who got government jobs did not create new in-
stitutions that could employ them after they left the government.  Rather, 
they found jobs in already-existing law firms.
70  I believe this is yet another 
 
65. See TELES, supra note 2, at 151 (“Conservative foundations were especially vital in the 
Society’s early years . . . .”). 
66. See id. at 165 (explaining the development of Society networks without “any direction from 
the center”). 
67. See id. at 92–93 (characterizing Hayek as a classical liberal thinker who viewed networking 
as a way to correct for the “scattering” of advocates for classical liberalism and who founded the 
Mont Pelerin Society to attempt to accomplish this goal). 
68. Teles observes that “[t]his function was . . . more important in the Society’s early years.”  
Id. at 166.  But see id. at 158–59 (quoting a confidential interview taken, apparently, after 2000, in 
which a “former official in the George W. Bush administration” refers to “membership and 
especially leadership in the Federalist Society” as “a costly signal of commitment to legal 
conservatism”). 
69. For the phrase, see id. at 165.  On Monica Goodling, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER 
STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ 
special/s0807/final.pdf.  The Report summarizes its conclusions about Goodling: “[O]ur 
investigation found that she solicited and received résumés for [Immigration Judge] and [Board of 
Immigration Appeals] candidates from the White House, from Republican members of Congress, 
the Republican National Lawyers Association, the Federalist Society, and from individuals with 
Republican Party affiliations.”  Id. at 121. 
70. Compare TELES, supra note 2, at 25 (chronicling the formation of liberal public interest law 
firms by former members of the FDR administration), with id. at 61, 64 (discussing the formation of 
two early conservative public interest law firms—Pacific Legal Foundation, which drew support 460  Texas Law Review  [Vol. 87:447 
 
indication of the limited extent of the conservative movement’s rise, and of 
the residual effects prior regimes always have.
71  As the administrative state 
has not been dismantled or even substantially whittled down, all that conser-
vative legal activists can do is what the Happy Hot Dogs had done—learn to 
make a living from it. 
V.  Reflections and Conclusions 
As I noted in the Introduction, Teles locates his descriptions in a larger 
theoretical framework associated with the political-science approach known 
as American political development, which focuses on relatively large-scale 
regime transformations.  The big picture is clear enough: facing a moribund 
New Deal–Great Society political order with its associated institutions, con-
servatives first developed alternative institutions, including those of the con-
servative legal movement, then attempted to implement their program in the 
Reagan–Gingrich era.  I have suggested that conservatives succeeded in dis-
placing the New Deal–Great Society order but failed to replace it with a con-
servative one.  Rather, divided government prevailed through the Reagan–
Gingrich Era. 
According to Søren Kierkegaard, life must be lived forwards but can be 
understood only backwards.
72  Liberal legal theory came to its conceptualiza-
tion of the role of public interest law firms only in the late 1960s, when the 
New Deal–Great Society political order was on its last legs.  Is Teles’s con-
ceptualization of the conservative legal movement timed similarly?  Specu-
lation about what comes next is only that.  Scholars of American political 
development have identified two important features of the U.S. political 
order: Every regime leaves behind a residue with which its successor must 
deal, and every successor regime considers how it can appropriate the insti-
tutional innovations of its predecessor for its own purposes.
73  My specula-
tions focus on both sides of the political spectrum. 
 
from the California Chamber of Commerce, and Mountain States Legal Foundation, which was 
founded and financially supported by Joseph Coors). 
71. Id. at 180 (summarizing the conservative legal movement’s “inject[ion of] competition into 
the legal profession” but its failure to create “a new establishment”). 
72. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, THE ESSENTIAL KIERKEGAARD 12 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. 
Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2000) (1843).  Relatedly, “[T]he owl of Minerva begins 
its flight only with the onset of dusk.”  G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
23 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821). 
73. See Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory Building in 
the Fullness of Time, in POLITICAL ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII, at 111, 138 (Ian Shapiro & Russell 
Hardin eds., 1996) (articulating a theory of political institutional development that “replac[es] the 
expectation of an ordered space bounded in synchronized time with the expectation of a politicized 
push and pull arrayed around multiple institutional arrangements with diverse historical origins”); 
see also Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Regimes and Regime Building in American 
Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 689, 702 (1998–1999) (“[A] 
regime may hang together for a time, but it never really fits together, and the contentious interaction 
of old and new elements keeps it in a more or less constant state of transformation.”). 2008]  What Consequences Do Ideas Have?  461 
 
On the liberal side, we can see the residue of the New Deal–Great 
Society order in the transformation of the American Bar Association (ABA) 
from a generally conservative organization with a particular focus on rela-
tively narrow professional issues into a generally liberal organization offer-
ing support for liberal programs across a rather wide range of issues.
74  
Liberals also emulated the conservative legal movement by creating a 
counter-Federalist Society (the American Constitution Society), structured in 
roughly the same form as the Federalist Society, and a think tank with sub-
stantial foundation funding and a relatively long-term perspective (the Center 
for American Progress).  As Teles emphasizes, though, direct appropriation 
of the institutional forms of liberal legalism did not work for the conservative 
legal movement, and it remains to be seen whether liberals’ appropriation of 
the institutional forms of the conservative legal movement will work—or 
even be sustained into the next constitutional era.
75 
On the conservative side, the risks are familiar.  At the lowest level, but 
arguably the most important one, we can detect a fair amount of self-
satisfaction in the interviews Teles conducted.
76  If conditions change, as 
they inevitably will, the conservative legal movement will have to innovate 
again, and it is unclear to me that self-satisfied organizers are likely to do so.  
And, as I have suggested in discussing the current state of law and economics 
and the Federalist Society job network, it is also unclear whether the conser-
vative legal movement has available a second generation of potential 
innovators.
77  Related to this, institutions always face the problem of 
organization maintenance under changed conditions, with the modal response 
being neurosis—continuing to do what has been done even in the face of 
change.  If I am right in suggesting that the conservative legal movement’s 
achievements were limited by the nature of the divided-government regime 
of the late twentieth century, neurosis is a promising strategy for 
 
74. Teles provides descriptions of how people associated with the conservative legal movement 
came to see the ABA in the late twentieth century.  See TELES, supra note 2, at 156–58 (relating the 
Federalist Society’s concern with respect to biased ABA ratings of federal judicial nominees); id. at 
167–69 (detailing the Federalist Society’s criticism of the dissenters on the ABA panel that 
endorsed Judge Robert Bork for the Supreme Court vacancy).  Their perceptions were accurate. 
75. I personally am quite skeptical about the possibility that liberal funders will continue to take 
the long view and support institution-building outside the government in the event that liberals 
retake control of the government’s institutions. 
76. I find it particularly jarring, and not encouraging about their intellectual nimbleness, for 
conservatives to continue to present themselves as victims and to continue to focus on the Bork 
nomination twenty years after the event.  See generally T ELES,  supra  note 2, at 169, 169–71 
(illustrating the “sense of martyrdom” that conservatives have continued to use as motivation in the 
aftermath of the Bork nomination). 
77. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing the absence of a “B Team” of 
conservative public interest law firms); see also TELES, supra note 2, at 173–78 (discussing the 
limited effectiveness of the Olin Foundation in replenishing the supply of conservative law 
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organizational maintenance only if conservatives manage to create a unified 
conservative political order, which at this moment seems quite unlikely.
78 
Organizational maintenance, then, can degenerate into ossification.   
Conservative public interest law firms may continue to raise money and file 
law suits, with increasingly small payoffs, because they do not know how to 
do anything else and their employees have nowhere else to go.  The 
Federalist Society will continue to hold national meetings and local events, 
but its job-placement function may be increasingly difficult to perform.  In 
short, the conservative legal movement, having risen, may well plateau—
which would be too bad from an intellectual point of view, because its rise, 
as recounted by Teles, tells us a great deal about the U.S. political order in 
the late twentieth century.  But then, of course, so would the plateauing of the 
conservative legal movement tell us much about the U.S. political order in 
the early twenty-first. 
 
 
78. Control by Democrats of both houses of Congress seems assured for the near future, which 
would make unified conservative government impossible. 